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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
man to breach the peace; 1- a law making it a crime to advocate the
overthrow of government by unlawful force; 14 and a statute penal-
izing a person who edited printed matter tending to encourage and
advocate disrespect for law.15
In the case under discussion, two factors were present along with
the rights of the individual to a fair criminal standard: (1) the local
need to stamp out crimes arising from such publications and (2) the
ability to strictly define the scope of the subject matter in question.
Although it does not deny that a state may punish circulation of
objectionable printed matter, the court maintains that the clause "so
massed as to incite crime" can become meaningful only by concrete
instances, since it has no technical nor common law definition. 16 The
dissent expresses doubt as to whether more clarity can be reached.
Should the New York legislature enumerate the objectionable pub-
lications, or are they to specify in detail the ingredients that incite
these violent and depraved crimes? 17 Why does the lewd and ob-
scene which have always been condemned by the courts enjoy a con-
stitutional prerogative over criminal tales that lead to bloodshed? Is
If it be granted that the material considered objectionable can be no
more clearly defined by our legislatures, there remains the problem
whether the expediency of the state must bow to the individual's
right to have notice of an ascertainable standard of guilt. The court
here felt that the need did not justify the sanctioning of a statute
deemed repugnant to due process of law.
V. O'N.
CRIMINAL LAW - PuRE FOOD AND DRUG ACT - MISLEADING
LITERATURE ACCOMPANYING DRUG IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-
Defendant was tried and convicted for violations of Section 301. of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of June 25, 1938.1 Each
violation arose out of the shipping of a drug in interstate commerce,
and the subsequent shipment of explanatory literature to the same
consignee, which literature contained certain false and misleading
statements, thereby rendering the drug misbranded 2 within the mean-
13 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 86 L. ed. 1031 (1942).
14 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925).
'5 Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 59 L. ed. 575 (1915).
16 Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 597, 92 L. ed. 654, 662 (1948).
17 Ibid.
18 See note 16 supra.
152 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 301 (1946).
"The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited:
(a) The introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce
of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.
252 STAT. 1050 (1938), 21 U. S. C. §352 (1946).
"A drug or device shall be deemed to be misbranded ...
(a) If its labeling is false or misleading in any particular ......
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ing of the statute.3 Defendant's principal contention was that there
could be no crime since the allegedly misleading literature did not
physically accompany the drug while in interstate commerce. Held,
judgment upholding the conviction affirmed. The Act itself does not
require, in order to constitute a violation thereof, that the descrip-
tive literature be transmitted contemporaneously with the drug, and
the court will not attribute such a meaning to the words of the statute.
The statute is not to be narrowly construed where the result of such
narrow and technical construction is a frustration of the purpose of
the Act which is to protect the innocent consumers. Kordel v. United
States, 335 U. S. 345, 93 L. ed. 73 (1948).
This question and its various ramifications have had an inter-
esting history in the courts. The Supreme Court decided to hear
this case in order to settle a controversy brought on by a contradic-
tory decision of the same question in another circuit.4 Originally the
Act encompassed only such products as "shall bear" the false and
misleading printed matter.5 This provision could be circumvented
easily by the simple expediency of enclosing the printed matter in
the package but not affixed to the bottle or container. Subsequently
the Congress attempted to prevent such evasions of the spirit of the
law by including explanatory printed materials contained in the pack-
age in the text of the law.6 But even this was not sufficient. Enter-
prising drug merchants began sending the descriptive literature under
separate cover. In a further attempt to obviate continued exploita-
tion of loopholes in the law, Congress in 1938 again amended the
statute to its present form.7
Since the latest amendment has been in effect there have been
both criminal and civil actions involving its interpretation in most of
the federal circuits.8 The majority of the circuit courts have held
in conformity with the opinion in the instant case, but a few had
clung to the theory that the "accompanying" must be physical, and
where the descriptive literature was not enclosed in the same package
with the drug, the minority of the courts found no violation.
By this present decision the Supreme Court has settled this
phase of the controversy. It is now established that descriptive or
instructive literature, not otherwise free of the onus of the statute,
will come under its prohibitive provisions when there is a "functional"
352 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U. S. C. §321(m) (1946).
"The term 'labeling' means all labels and other written, printed, or graphic
matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) ac-
companying such article."
Urbuteit v. United States, 164 F. 2d 245 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
G34 STAT. 768 (1906).
0 37 STAT. 416 (1912).
7 See note 3 supra.8 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277, 88 L. ed. 48 (1943),
reversing 131 F. 2d 500 (C. C. A. 2d 1942); United States v. Sullivan, 332
U. S. 689, - L. ed. - (1948), reversing 161 F. 2d 629 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
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relationship between the printed material and the drug. It matters
not that there is a time interval of weeks, months, or even years 9
between the shipment of the drug and the mailing of the literature.
There is a violation if the court finds the necessary "textual rela-
tionship," and this relationship, when found, constitutes "accom-
panying" within the meaning of the disputed section. As Mr. Justice
Douglas said: "One article or thing is accompanied by another when
it supplements or explains it, in the manner that a committee report
of the Congress accompanies a bill." 10
However, as suggested in the dissenting opinion (in which three
justices concurred), there is a need for congressional revision of the
phraseology of other sections of the Act, if the courts are to be spared
the necessity of further judicial interpretations of ambiguous stat-
utes. Guided by the intent of the law-makers the courts will con-
tinue to seek the protection of the unsuspecting consumers, but that
worthy purpose can be rendered easier of accomplishment by a timely
clarification of the statutes involved.
W.G.
FEDERAL CROP INSURANcE-FEDERAL REGISTER AS EFFECTIVE
NoTIcE.-Plaintiff, an Idaho farmer, procured crop insurance from
the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation' after receiving the assur-
ance of local agents of the corporation that the crop was insurable.
Thereafter, plaintiff's crops failed and he sought recovery under the
terms of the policy. The corporation opposed any recovery under
the policy on the ground that the plaintiff's crop was uninsurable.
Neither the plaintiff nor the agents knew that under the Wheat Crop
Insurance Regulations, which had been duly published in the Fed-
eral Register, the crop was actually uninsurable.2 The Idaho state
court in which the plaintiff brought his action, invoking the doctrine
of equitable estoppel, allowed evidence to the effect that plaintiff was
not apprised of the regulations and had been misled by the represen-
tations of the corporation's agents into believing that the crop was
insurable. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court judgment for
plaintiff was affirmed.3  Held, reversed 5 to 4. Estoppel is not ap-
plicable here, for the appearance of rules and regulations in the Fed-
eral Register is ". . . sufficient to give notice of such [rules and
1 One count in the informations against Kordel alleged that the printed
matter was posted 561 days after the shipment of the drugs.
10 Kordel v. United States, 335 U. S. 345, 350, 93 L. ed. 73 (1948).
1 The Corporation, a government agency, was created in 1938 by the Fed-
eral Crop Insurance Act, 52 STAT. 72 (1938), 7 U. S. C. § 150 et seq. (1946),
for the purpose of insuring farmers' crops against loss due to drought and
other causes.
27 Code Fed. Regs. §414 (Supp. 1945), 10 Fed. Reg. 1585 (1945).
3 67 Idaho 196, 174 P. 2d 834 (1946).
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